Research and Development of the Metal Hydride System
Issue: The use of the hydride storage system is innovative and has a number of advantages. It has been recognized that this system requires more active control. Specifying and testing the hardware perhaps even at a small scale would be very valuable. Reliable operation of this system and its controls will be critical to successful operation of the absorber. Safety issues associated with the hydride system including relief valves, pressure vessel ratings and the impact of utility failures will need to be examined. Particular care should be taken to ensure that the hydrogen gas system through the experiment never drops below atmospheric pressure. We feel that R&D time spent on this system in advance will pay off in a more reliable system.
Response:
We have developed a plan for testing the hydride system. The plan involves building the hydrogen system for the first MICE absorber cell. As part of this process, we are looking at how the system will be controlled. This has led to some minor changes in the instrumentation. We have received additional information from the supplier regarding the behavior of the hydride in the beds. An R&D plan has been submitted for inclusion in the development program for the coming UK financial year. See Appendix 3. As discussed earlier, it may not be desirable to operate the hydrogen bed above atmospheric pressure at all times, so an argon jacket may be required. 
Window Development

Response:
The R&D plan for the welded-window option already addresses this point. Thermocouples will be attached at the window-to-flange junction and at various points around the window to see what temperatures are reached in each location during welding. While the bolted window remains our baseline choice, final selection of this option is conditional upon the satisfactory demonstration of a reliable seal with repeatable performance. While it is possible to monitor the space between a double indium seal for leaks, it is not clear that this is the best scheme to employ. Insofar as the monitoring pipes connected to the seal gap area are non-trivial to connect, and could themselves represent a leak risk, it is not obvious that this approach enhances system safety and reliability. The only place the hydrogen can leak to is the absorber vacuum space, and this is more easily monitored for hydrogen than is the inter-seal gap. If there were a significant leakage of hydrogen into the absorber vacuum space, the heat leak into the absorber would increase markedly. A pressure of about 10 -2 torr would correspond to a heat leak of roughly 5 W 5 into an absorber; more than this would be unacceptable. Our upper leak rate limit of 10 -2 torr L s -1 , ensures that we can maintain a pressure below 10 -4 torr in the absorber vacuum space with a 100 L/s pump-well below the problem regime. Actions to be taken as a result of monitoring the absorber vacuum space pressure are summarized in Table 1 . Response: Most of the standard cryogenic probes are well within the "intrinsically safe" power limits set by the NEC. In addition, pressure valves and other equipment can be made "intrinsically safe" by straightforward modifications (usually, a sealed cover or container). We have to carefully consider what the thresholds are for some minor action (e.g., increase or decrease the metal hydride bed temperature) as opposed to major action (e.g., system purge or power shutoff).
Recommendation 2: There is a significant hazard with stray magnetic fields causing tools and other equipment to become projectiles. Restricting access to the experimental area and attention to house keeping should reduce this hazard.
Response: Access into the experimental hall will be restricted, and the area around the experimental hall will be fenced. Before switching on the magnet power supplies, the MICE Operating Procedures will require that a person on shift inspect the fenced area and remove any tools or other objects that might become projectiles.
Recommendation 3:
Under no circumstances should equipment be operated with the thin absorber or vacuum windows exposed.
Response: We agree that this is a critical requirement and it will be one of the MICE Operating Procedures. Response: This has always been our design philosophy. All hydrogen gas system pipes are welded, and all required joints will be made with Conflat or other suitably robust flanged connections. Table 2 below summarizes pipe joint details. No Swagelock fittings or plastic tubing will be employed in the hydrogen piping system. Response: Hydrogen detectors will be installed at various locations in the experimental hall. If hydrogen is detected, these sensors will trigger the personnel evacuation alarm and initiate a high-rate mode of the ventilation system. Response: We agree with this recommendation, and our design of the MICE safety system will take it fully into account.
Recommendation 7:
The good work started with the HAZOP process should be continued and expanded. This should include a scenario in which both the absorber and vacuum windows fail at the same time.
Response: This remains our intention. We understand that the HAZOP presented at the review was only preliminary. As the operating modes become more fully defined, we will proceed to the next stage of HAZOP analysis. Our definition of a "safe" design is one that will tolerate two simultaneous failures, so the scenario with two windows failing is already part of our analysis. We will also do a Failure Mode and Effect analysis for all identified failure modes.
Recommendation 8: The collaboration should plan in advance how it will respond to leaks or problems of various levels with the absorber system. Making these decisions in advance will help prevent the temptation to continue running with a problem.
Response: This is very good advice and we will follow it. Various scenarios of absorber leaks and equipment malfunctions will be analyzed and the appropriate response procedures will be specified in the written MICE Operating Procedures.
Recommendation 9: The potential of liquid hydrogen being pushed into a warm part of the piping with resulting flashing should be considered carefully. Techniques such as heat sinking the pipes or using vertical runs should be examined. This problem could have a significant impact on system operations.
Response: This is being addressed together with our design approach to the LH 2 Level Control. See Appendix 4 for further comments.
Recommendation 10:
A failure mode analysis should be done on the possibility of leaks between the helium and hydrogen portions of the heat exchanger. As an example, the helium circuit operates at 18 bar, much higher than the absorber pressure. Thorough testing of the heat exchanger is needed.
Response:
The helium system will be designed for 18 bar, and leak tested to a high standard, at 1.25 times the design pressure, after the necessary thermal cycling, as specified in our leak test requirement, Table 4 -4 of the Preliminary Design Document (reproduced below for completeness). This should minimize the possibility of such an event. Nevertheless, as part of the HAZOP process we plan to assess how this problem might manifest itself in operation, how to detect it, and how to deal with it. Response: A draft Quality Control and Quality Assurance document has been prepared and will be implemented once approved by the MICE Project Manager. Three levels of control are identified to ensure proper attention to QA/QC issues:
• Level 1: systems, components, structures, and materials that are unique or whose failure could jeopardize facility personnel safety, safe emergency shutdown capability, or ISIS operation
• Level 2: systems, components, structures, and materials whose failure would render MICE inoperable for substantial periods, damage other critical equipment, decrease MICE performance, or delay start-up
• Level 3: all other items
Recommendation 12: The list of certifications required should be reviewed to ensure that all the certifications required can in fact be met. If it is not possible to meet a given certification, the impact of not meeting the certification on system safety should be considered and explained to the RAL external safety committee.
Response: We will do this as part of the process of getting ready for the RAL "external" safety review.
Appendix 1. Buffer Volumes
Our original design, reproduced here in Fig. 1 , utilized a common buffer volume for venting both the absorber and its surrounding vacuum space. In both cases, the buffer volume was separated from the working regions by means of relief valves and burst disks. The Panel has convinced us that it is more effective to vent directly to the outside, and we now intend to do so. The RAL safety code does not demand a buffer volume of 52 times the liquid-hydrogen volume, and our finite-element calculations have convinced us that a spill does not develop unsafe pressures in the system. For these reasons, we are satisfied that the current buffer vacuum space, roughly 12 times the liquid-hydrogen volume, provides adequate safety margin.
The new design (see Appendix 2) does include a 1 m 3 buffer volume on the input line to the absorber. This simplifies level control and provides some window protection by providing an overflow space. 
Appendix 2. Changes in MICE Hydrogen System
The updated diagram of the MICE hydrogen system is shown in Fig. 2 . As noted earlier, we have adopted suggestions from the Review Panel in the following areas:
• the original buffer vessel on the relief line has been removed
• a venting manifold filled with nitrogen has been added
• separate vent lines for the absorber and the absorber vacuum space have been implemented
In addition, we have added a 1 m 3 buffer vessel on the input line between the hydride bed and the absorber. After studying the layout more carefully, we have decided to eliminate the ventilation system in favor of placing most of the hydrogen equipment within the hydrogen extraction hood. 
Appendix 3. R&D Program on Metal Hydride Storage System
In considering what R&D should be done, the first issue to decide is whether we should study a small-scale version of the final system or a full-scale prototype. We have chosen to study a full-scale system, with the idea that it will later be used as the first unit for MICE. Due to funding limitations, the R&D program has not yet been initiated, but we hope for funding approval in [2004] [2005] .
The R&D goals of the program are listed below:
• establish working parameters for a hydride bed in the three operational modes, storage, filling the absorber, and emptying the absorber
• measure absorption and desorption rates as a function of relevant parameters, such as temperature and pressure
• determine the purity of the hydrogen and the effects of impurities on system operation
• determine power requirements for hydride bed heating and cooling
• define the instrumentation (safety relief valves, sensors, and interlocks) required for safe and reliable operation of the system
The program outlined is an ambitious one, but is clearly necessary in order to be assured of a safe and robust system for MICE.
